We prove a computational soundness theorem for symmetric-key encryption protocols that can be used to analyze security against adaptively corrupting adversaries (that is, adversaries who corrupt protocol participants during protocol execution). Our soundness theorem shows that if the encryption scheme used in the protocol is semantically secure, and encryption cycles are absent, then security against adaptive corruptions is achievable via a reduction factor of O(n · (2n) l ), with n and l being (respectively) the size and depth of the key graph generated during any protocol execution. Since, in most protocols of practical interest, the depth of key graphs (measured as the longest chain of ciphertexts of the form
Introduction
Imagine a large group of users engaged in a private virtual conversation over the Internet. The group is monitored by a group manager who ensures that at all points in time, users share a common secret key which is used for secure communication within the group (e.g., for encrypting all data that is exchanged between group members). Over time, the composition of the group changes-users can leave and/or join it at various (a priori unknown) instants-and, accordingly, the manager sends "update" messages to the group which enable all and only current participants to acquire the common secret. At some calamitous hour, a large number of user terminals get hijacked (e.g., an Internet worm infects half the Windows users in the group) and all information possessed by these users gets compromised. Clearly, this results in the compromise of group data that was exchanged while these ill-fated participants were part of the group. The question iscan one be sure that the data for other instants (that is, instants when affected participants were all outside the group) is still secure?
Answering such a question in the affirmative, even for simple security protocols (based on conventional, symmetric-key encryption alone) is often beset with tough challenges. The possibility of user corruptions occurring during protocol execution, and in a manner that is adaptively controlled by the attacker, increases the threat to a protocol's security and makes the task of proving protocols secure an unnerving task. It is known that, in general, protocols proven secure against non-adaptive attacks may actually turn insecure once an adversary is allowed to corrupt participants adaptively. (See [CFGN96] for a simple separation result for protocols based on secret sharing.) The situation is especially annoying for protocols that make use of encryption-adversaries can spy on ciphertexts exchanged between two honest parties, and later, at will, corrupt one of the parties, acquire its internal state, and use such information to "open" all ciphertexts which were previously sent or received by that party. While trying to prove security of such a protocol, one must argue that all "unopened" ciphertexts (those that cannot be decrypted trivially using the compromised keys) leak essentially no information to the adversary (that is, appear as good as encryptions of random bitstrings). The heart of the problem lies in the fact that one does not a priori know which ciphertexts are going to be opened by the adversary since these decisions are made only as the protocol proceeds. Besides, every ciphertext is a binding commitment to the plaintext it hides-one cannot hope to "fool" the adversary by sending encryptions of random bitstrings every time and then, when he corrupts a party, somehow convince him that the ciphertexts he saw earlier on (and which he can now open) were, in fact, encryptions of real data.
Previous Approaches. In the past, security analysis of encryption-based multiparty protocols against adaptive adversaries has largely been conducted using three approaches. The first (and the simplest one) involves bypassing adaptive security altogether-if you cannot prove a protocol adaptively secure, then so be it. (That is, rest your minds with non-adaptive security.) For example, many recent papers on broadcast encryption [AKI03, BGW05, DC06] introduce protocols which improve upon previous proposals significantly (typically in terms of efficiency), but leave the question of adaptive security of their protocols unresolved. This is rather unfortunate. We believe that adaptive corruptions model a particularly interesting attack scenario (and a practical one, too!), and it is worthwhile to explore solutions that address the threats posed by them before improving upon other metrics (like efficiency).
The second approach to adaptive security has worked around the problem by studying it in restricted models where strict rules are imposed on the behaviour of honest participants. The most common imposition is that of erasure [BH92]-all honest parties should erase their past state the moment they enter a new state configuration (wherein keys are generated afresh). Intuitively, such an imposition (rather, honest abidance by it) enables us to achieve adaptively secure encryption protocols because adversaries can no longer "open" previously-sent ciphertexts even after corrupting the involved parties; doing so requires the keys used to create the ciphertexts in the first place, which, we trust, have been diligently erased from the system. However, investing such a level of trust in honest parties is an unrealistic proposition-an honest party could simply forget to erase its previous states, or else, internally deviate from the rules of the game (that is, purposely store past keys and behave in an "honest-but-curious" manner). Besides, some cryptographic protocols, for the sake of improving efficiency, require users to store keys received in the past and such protocols (an example will be discussed in this paper) would need to be re-designed in order to comply with the model.
The third approach, and perhaps the most compelling one, to adaptive security has been to develop non-standard notions of security of an encryption scheme. This corresponds to a line of research initiated by Canetti et al. [CFGN96] , who introduced a cryptographic primitive, called non-committing encryption, specifically to address the problem of adaptive corruptions in multiparty protocols. Non-committing encryption schemes have the unusual property that ciphertexts created using them need not behave as binding commitments on the corresponding plaintexts (hence the name "non-committing"). That is, it is possible that an encryption of '0' collide with an encryption of '1' (or, more generally, encryption of real data be the same as encryption of a random bitstring). However, such collisions occur with only negligible probability-the chances of encrypting '0' and obtaining a ciphertext which can later be opened as '1' are very small. At the same time, these schemes allow to sample "ambiguous" ciphertexts (those that can be opened as either '0' or '1') efficiently and to convince an adversary of such a ciphertext being an encryption of '0' or of '1', as the situation demands. Encryption protocols implemented with non-committing encryption can be proven to achieve adaptive security quite easily-in the security proof, one just simulates the real protocol by transmitting ambiguous ciphertexts and upon corruption of a party, convinces the adversary that the ciphertexts he saw earlier were indeed the encryptions of the revealed data. Non-committing encryption schemes, though interesting in their own right, have their share of limitations-they are typically too inefficient for practical applications, and require bounding (a priori) the number of message bits that can be encrypted using any single key (usually, the number of bits that can be encrypted with a key cannot be more than the size of the key itself, which is highly prohibitive for real applications) 1 .
Our Contribution. In this paper, we show that it is possible to argue about the adaptive security of a large class of encryption protocols, without requiring erasures and without resorting to primitives like non-committing encryption, while simultaneously achieving efficiency that meets practical requirements. We focus on protocols built generically from symmetric-key encryption (no other primitives are involved) and where every ciphertext is created by encrypting a key or a data element, with a single other key (no nesting of the encryption operation). We show that for a large variety of such protocols if keys are generated randomly and independently of each other, then protocols can be proven adaptively secure, even under the assumption that the encryption scheme is semantically secure, with very reasonable assurances on the strength of the protocol against adaptive corruptions.
Our main contribution is a general computational soundness theorem for encryption pro-tocols which works as follows. Consider an abstract game played between an adversary and a challenger, both being given a security parameter and access to a semantically secure symmetrickey encryption algorithm E. Initially, the challenger generates n random, independent keys k 1 , k 2 , · · · , k n and keeps them secret from the adversary. During the game, the adversary gradually and adaptively builds a directed graph G over n nodes labeled 1 through n. He arbitrarily introduces edges into the graph and for each such edge i → j he asks the challenger to provide an encryption of the key k j under the key k i , that is, E k i (k j ). (Thus, creation of the edge i → j in G depicts the fact that given k i , the adversary can recover k j , via the decryption operation corresponding to E.) The adversary can also (again adaptively) decide to "corrupt" some nodes in the graph-from time to time, he instructs the challenger to reveal the key associated with the ith node in G (for any arbitrary i) and the challenger must answer with k i in such a situation. We refer to G as the key graph generated by the adversary and the nodes in G that correspond to the revealed keys are called corrupt nodes. Note that any node i in G that is reachable from a corrupt node i is also effectively corrupt; the adversary can recover the corresponding key using successive decryptions along the path from i to i . The question is-can we prove that, at the end of the game, keys corresponding to nodes that are not reachable from any of the corrupt nodes, are still pseudorandom? This simple game (formalized further in Section 2) provides an effective abstraction for many of the challenges a security analyst can expect to face when proving protocols secure against adaptive corruptions. The power to corrupt nodes in an adaptive fashion models the ability of attackers to compromise keys of users during the execution of the protocol. The power to decide the structure of all ciphertexts abstracts the fact that the execution flow of the protocol is indeterminable at design time and can potentially be influenced by the adversary during run-time. (A slight variant of the game would be one in which the adversary can also acquire ciphertexts formed by encrypting arbitrary messages of his choice. We will discuss this variant further in Section 2.) Note that we allow the creation of ciphertexts even after nodes have been corrupted (that is, the compromise of a key at some point in the protocol should not hamper security of ciphertexts created using future uncompromised keys). Likewise, the security of keys transmitted in the past must be preserved even if other keys are compromised in the future 2 .
A naive first step to proving security in the game we just described would be to guess, a priori, the set of nodes that the adversary is going to corrupt during the execution and for every edge issuing from such a node, reply with a real ciphertext (while for the other edges reply with encryptions of random bitstrings). Any security reduction seeded with an idea that involves guessing a subset of nodes in this manner would give us a reduction factor that is exponential in n (that is, we would end up proving a statement like "if the encryption scheme is -secure then security in the game is guaranteed with probability 2 n "). Such a reduction would be completely impractical; in most applications, n would be of the order of the number of protocol participants, which can be extremely large.
In this paper, we prove security in this game using a significantly different approach, and one that is of much better practical value. We show that if the key graph G generated by the adversary is acyclic 3 and if its depth (defined as the length of the longest path in G) is upper bounded by a parameter l, then security in our game can be proven via a reduction factor of O(n · (2n) l ). Here, by "security in our game" we mean that keys that (a) cannot be trivially recovered by the adversary (that is, are not reachable from corrupt nodes in G) and (b) are not used to encrypt other keys 4 , remain pseudorandom at the end of it. That is, we prove that the security of a semantically secure encryption scheme can degrade in the face of adaptive attacks (as those captured by our game) by a factor of at most O(n·(2n) l ) but not by worse.
An Application. So what is this reduction good for? At first glance, it would appear that it is much worse than the naive solution-l could potentially be of the order of n and n · (2n) n is obviously no more consoling than 2 n . Well, for arbitrary key graphs, this is indeed the case. However, in practice, key graphs are much smaller (in fact, orders of magnitude smaller) in depth than in total size. For example, the key graphs generated in the execution of most broadcast encryption protocols (those falling under the subset-cover framework introduced by Naor et al.
[NNL01]) have depth 1 and their depth remains fixed for arbitrarily long runs of the protocol. All encryption-based group key distribution protocols (designed for secure multicast over the Internet, and also called multicast encryption protocols) generate key graphs that have depth at most logarithmic in the total number of users in the system (again, the depth remains fixed for arbitrarily long runs of the protocol, once the total space of users has been ascertained). In general, in all encryption protocols, the depth of key graphs created in any execution is likely to be related to the number of decryptions performed by users (in order to be able to recover certain keys or messages) while their total size to the number of users themselves; it is reasonable to expect that protocol designers, for the purpose of efficiency, would strive to keep the former smaller than the latter.
We exemplify the power of our soundness result by applying it to the security analysis of the Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) protocol [WGL00]. LKH is a protocol originally developed for secure communication in multicast groups on the Internet (applications of the form we discussed in the first paragraph) and has since then attracted a lot of interest from both cryptographers and researchers in the networking community. Surprisingly, even though the protocol gets mentioned in several papers on cryptography, there has been little effort from within our community towards analyzing its security (adaptive or otherwise) rigorously or to make any claims to the contrary.
The original LKH protocol has a security flaw in it [MP06] . Although this flaw is quite easy to spot, we are not aware of any work (prior to ours) that rectifies this flaw in a provably secure manner. (In [MP06] , a fix is suggested but not proven secure.) In Section 3 of this paper, we present a variant of LKH which is not only as efficient as the original protocol, but also enjoys strong guarantees of security against adaptive adversaries. In particular, we use our soundness theorem to show that the security of the improved protocol is related to the semantic security of the underlying encryption scheme via a reduction factor that is quasi-polynomial in the number of protocol participants. Concretely, our reduction factor is of the order ofñ log 2 (n)+2 , where n is the number of users in the protocol andñ = O(n).
This reduction factor, though not strictly polynomial in n, is still quite reasonable from a practical perspective. For example, in a system with 128 users, one is guaranteed that an execution of our protocol provides at least 65 bits of adaptive security when implemented with 128-bit AES in counter mode (for a run with upto 64 key updates) 5 . Our result practically eliminates the need for using expensive techniques like non-committing encryption to build adaptively secure multicast encryption protocols, and it does this while matching the efficiency of existing schemes.
Relation with Selective Decryption. The abstract game used in our soundness theorem is reminiscent of the well-studied (though largely unresolved) problem of selective decryption. In this problem (like in ours), an adversary interacts with a challenger who initially generates a set of plaintexts m 1 , · · · , m n and a corresponding set of keys k 1 , · · · , k n . (We stress here that the plaintexts are not chosen by the adversary, but generated by the challenger using some fixed distribution.) The adversary first wants to see the encryptions of all the plaintexts, {E k i (m i )} n i=1 , and later "open" some of them adaptively; that is, he queries an arbitrary set I ⊆ [n] and the challenger replies with {k i } i∈I . The question now is to show that plaintexts corresponding to all unopened ciphertexts are still "safe", in the sense that the adversary cannot learn any more information about them than what he could learn from the revealed plaintexts. In our soundness theorem, we are essentially generalizing this game to a setting in which the adversary can ask for not only single ciphertexts but chains of ciphertexts of the form
and he is also allowed to open such chains adaptively (as above). Plus, we allow the adversary to interleave his "encrypt" and "open" queries arbitrarily. (Indeed, the fact that ciphertexts can be asked for in an adaptive manner, possibly depending upon past corruptions, is responsible for much of the complication in our proof.) It is for this reason that we refer to our game (detailed in Section 2) as the generalized selective decryption (GSD) game.
Does this paper solve the selective decryption problem? Not really. A crucial ingredient of that problem is the distribution from which the plaintexts m 1 , · · · , m n are drawn by the challenger. It has been shown [DNRS03] that if this distribution is such that each plaintext can be generated independently of the others then the unopened ciphertexts indeed remain secure and the adversary learns essentially no partial information about the plaintexts they hide from his interaction with the challenger. In the GSD game, too, we require all keys, even those which are not used for further encryption, to be generated independently of each other, and this "independence property" is crucial in our proof 6 . Our soundness theorem essentially builds up on this positive result for selective decryption and extends it to the more general scenario of arbitrarily (and adaptively) generated key graphs. The question of solving selective decryption without the independence assumption on plaintexts still remains open.
We remark here that independence of all keys is not just a simplifying assumption in our theorem; it is almost a requirement for the security of the protocols we are interested in analyzing. A multicast encryption protocol that uses related keys across key updates may not guarantee good security at all. [MP05, MP06] . Although most of the literature on computational soundness theorems deals with protocols that make use of encryption as the fundamental primitive, to the best of our knowledge, none of these works prove soundness in the presence of adaptively corrupting adversaries. Recently, Gupta and Shmatikov [GS06] developed a symbolic logic that allows reasoning about a weak variant of adaptive security for the case of key exchange protocols; however, the protocols they analyze, do not make use of encryption (and instead use Diffie-Hellman exponentiation coupled with signatures).
The soundness result of this paper is of a very different flavor than those in previous works in the area. The protocol model we use is relatively simpler-in the protocols we consider, every message generated during an execution is either a key or an encryption of a key under a key or else, a sequence of values with one of these types 7 . Symbolic analysis of such protocols can be effectively conducted using graph-theoretic terminology: keys can be interpretted as nodes, ciphertexts as edges, and Dolev-Yao attacks on protocols can be expressed in terms of reachability from adversarial nodes (corresponding to corrupted keys). As such, all discussions on symbolic analysis in this paper take place within a graph-theoretic framework (as illustrated by the GSD game). This simplifies our presentation considerably and brings us quickly to the crux of the matter.
Lastly, a few words comparing the result of this paper with our previous work, joint with Micciancio [MP05, MP06], on the computationally sound analysis of encryption protocols are in order. Although both our works address adaptive attacks on encryption protocols in general, the adversarial model used in the current work is stronger: we not only allow the adversary to adaptively modify the execution flow of the protocol (as in our past work) but also to corrupt participants in an adaptive manner. Tackling the latter type of attacks is significantly more non-trivial, and is the central theme of this paper. Another important difference is that our previous soundness results applied only to protocols that satisfied certain syntactic conditions besides acyclicity of key graphs. Informally, these conditions require protocols to use every key in two phases-a distribution phase in which keys are used as plaintexts, followed by a deployment phase in which the distributed keys are used for encrypting other keys or messages. Key distribution is not allowed to succeed key deployment. Such a condition, though not extremely restrictive, does raise some concerns. It is not hard to conceive scenarios in which one would want to distribute previously deployed keys. (In fact, some existing protocols do this, too; e.g., the protocol of [PST01] "re-distributes" keys regularly in order to compensate for packet losses.) Our new result, while incorporating adaptive corruptions, also does away with this restriction. The downside, however, is that this result provides security guarantees in a manner that is dependent on the depth of protocol key graphs, and it is not meaningful for protocols that generate arbitrary-depth key graphs. We believe that improving the result of this paper to overcome this limitation is non-trivial, but a worthy direction for future research; in particular, obtaining an analogous result with a reduction factor smaller than Θ(n l ) would be quite remarkable, and could lead to even newer techniques to address adaptive corruptions in security protocols.
The Main Result
Let Π = (E, D) be a symmetric-key encryption scheme 8 . We use the standard notion of indistinguishability against chosen plaintext attacks (Ind-CPA) for encryption schemes as defined by Bellare et al. [BDJR97] . Let O Π k,b denote a left-or-right oracle for Π which first generates a key k uniformly at random from {0, 1} η (η being the security parameter) and subsequently, 7 We remark that extending our result to protocols that use nested encryption is also possible, but the soundness theorem and the corresponding proof become much more complex. We avoid nested encryption largely for the sake of simplicity (and partly because most existing multicast encryption protocols don't use nesting).
8 In this paper, we consider encryption schemes where key generation is defined by picking a uniformly random bitstring from the set {0, 1} η with η being the security parameter. Thus, the key generation algorithm is implicit in the definition of encryption schemes. We also assume that the encryption scheme allows to encrypt arbitrary bitstrings; so, keys themselves can always be used as plaintexts.
responds to every query of the form (m 0 , m 1 ) ∈ {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * (such that |m 0 | = |m 1 |) with 
The GSD game. Consider the following game, which we call the generalized selective decryption (GSD) game, played between an adversary A and a challenger B, both being given blackbox access to a symmetric-key encryption scheme Π = (E, D). The game is parameterized by an integer n, assumed to be known to both A and B. In the beginning, the challenger generates a set of keys, k 1 , k 2 , · · · , k n , each key being sampled independently and uniformly at random from the set {0, 1} η (where η is the security parameter). B also generates a challenge bit b, uniformly at random from {0, 1}, which A is required to guess in the end. It stores the generated values for the rest of the game, and uses them to answer all of A's queries.
A can make three types of queries to B:
1. encrypt: At any point, A can make a query of the form encrypt(i, j), in response to which B creates a ciphertext c ← E k i (k j ) (using fresh coins for the encryption operation each time) and returns c to A.
corrupt:
A can also ask for the value of any key initially generated by B; it does this by issuing a query of the form corrupt(i), in response to which it receives k i .
3. challenge: Finally, A can issue a query of the form challenge(i). The response for such a query is decided based on the bit b: if b = 0, B returns the key k i to A, whereas if b = 1, it generates a value r i uniformly at random from {0, 1} η , and sends r i to A 9 .
Multiple queries of each type can be made, interleavingly and adaptively. We stress here that A can make more than one challenge queries in the game and it can choose to interleave its challenge queries with the other two types of queries. (This is a slight generalization of the setting described in the introduction.) Giving the adversary the power to make multiple challenge queries models the requirement that keys linked with challenge nodes be "jointly" pseudorandom (as opposed to individual keys being pseudorandom by themselves). Allowing it to interleave challenge's with other queries means that such keys are required to retain their pseudorandomness even after more corruptions or ciphertext transmissions have occurred.
We think of the queries of A as creating a directed graph over n nodes (labeled 1, 2, · · · , n), edge by edge, and in an adaptive fashion. Each query encrypt(i, j) corresponds to creating an edge from i to j, denoted i → j, in this graph. For any adversary A, the graph created by its queries in this manner is called the key graph generated by A and is denoted G(A). A node i in G(A) for which A issues a query corrupt(i) is called a corrupt node while one for which A issues a query challenge(i) is referred to as a challenge node. The set of all corrupt nodes is denoted V corr (A) and that of all challenge nodes is denoted V chal (A). Note that G(A), V corr (A) and V chal (A) are all random variables depending on the coins used by both A and B. Without loss of generality, we assume that V chal (A) is always non-empty and in any execution of A, every node i ∈ V chal (A) has at least one edge incident upon it. (Put differently, this means that A always makes at least one query of the form challenge(i) and for each such query, it makes at least one query of the form encrypt(x, i).) Legitimate Adversaries. There is a trivial way in which any adversary can win in the GSD game-by corrupting a node i in G(A) and making a query challenge(j) for any j that is reachable from i, A can easily compute the challenge bit b. The interesting case to consider is, thus, one in which A is constrained not to issue queries of this form, that is, where A is restricted to make queries in a manner such that no challenge node is reachable from a corrupt node in G(A).
Our intuition suggests that if the encryption scheme is secure (in the Ind-CPA sense), then the chances of such an adversary being able to decipher b correctly are no better than half. However, translating this intuition into a proof is far from easy. For one, it is not even possible to do this without further restrictions on the adversary's queries: if a key k j is used to encrypt other keys (that is, there exists an edge issuing from j in G(A)), then k j cannot be guaranteed to remain pseudorandom, even if j is not reachable from the corrupt nodes. In other words, we can hope to prove pseudorandomness of keys associated with challenge nodes only as long as these nodes have no outgoing edge in G(A). Secondly, arguing about the security of encryption schemes in the presence of key cycles is a gruelingly hard problem; in particular, it is currently not known whether an arbitrary Ind-CPA-secure encryption scheme can be proved to retain its security in a situation where ciphertexts of the form
, for some t > 1, are created using it. Standard techniques do not allow to prove such statements and counterexamples are not known either. Given this state of affairs, our only hope to prove security in the GSD game is to forbid the creation of key cycles altogether.
We formalize all our requirements from the adversary in the following definition:
Definition 2.2 An adversary A is called legitimate if in any execution of A in the GSD game, the values of G(A), V corr (A) and V chal (A) are such that:
1. For any i ∈ V corr (A) and any j ∈ V chal (A), j is unreachable from i in G(A).
G(A)
is a DAG and every node in V chal (A) is a sink in this DAG.
The first condition above is essentially a symbolic security criterion-what it means for the challenge nodes (or keys) to be secure against a Dolev-Yao adversary. The second condition spells out the syntactic restrictions that are required to prove the soundness of this symbolic criterion with respect to the actual (computational) adversary A we are considering.
The Result. Let A be any legitimate adversary playing the GSD game. We say that A is an (n, e, l)-adversary if in any execution, the number of nodes and edges in the key graph generated by A are bounded from above by n and e respectively and the depth of the graph (the length of the longest path in it) is at most l. We denote the random variable corresponding to the output of A in the game by A B Π b .
Definition 2.3 Let t, n, e, l ∈ IN + and 0 < < 1. An encryption scheme Π is called (t, , n, e, l)-GSD secure if for every legitimate (n, e, l)-adversary A running in time t, we have
Here, probabilities are taken over the random choices made by both A and B (including the randomness used by B in creating ciphertexts). The following is the main result of this paper:
Theorem 2.4 Let t, n, e, l ∈ IN + and 0 < < 1. If an encryption scheme Π is (t, )-Ind-CPA secure, then it is (t , , n, e, l)-GSD secure for quantities t and defined as:
where t GenKey (resp. t Encrypt ) denotes the time taken to perform key generation (resp. encryption) in Π.
Overview of the Proof. The starting point of the proof of our theorem is the positive result on the selective decryption problem (more precisely, the selective decommitment problem) due to Dwork et al. [DNRS03] . Consider first the GSD game for the case l = 1. The graph G(A) in this case is a directed bipartite graph mapping a set of sources to a set of sinks. (In the problem studied in [DNRS03], the map from sources to sinks is one-to-one. In our case, it could be manyto-many; plus, it could be adaptively generated based on previous corruptions.) How can we argue about security in this case? Intuitively, an attacker's ability to differentiate between real and random values for all nodes in V chal (A) translates into its ability to differentiate between the two values for some node (say the jth one) in V chal (A); that is, such an adversary can effectively differentiate between two worlds, one in which the reply to each of the first j − 1 queries of the form challenge(i) is r i (and for the rest, it is k i ), and the other in which the reply to each of the first j queries of this form is r i (and that for the rest is k i ). Let us call these worlds World j (0) and World j (1) respectively. Let us assume that the argument specified in A's jth challenge query is known a priori (it can be guessed with success probability 1/n) and equals i j . Let I(i j ) denote the set of nodes i s for which there exists an edge i s → i j in G(A). Now consider this modified version of the GSD game: While generating keys in the beginning, B also generates a random keyk i j , independently of all other keys. It replies to the adversary's queries in one of two worlds again, but now the worlds are defined as follows. Each query of the form encrypt(i s , i j ) is replied to with the real ciphertext E k is (k i j ) in the first world, World j (0), but with a fake one, namely E k is (k i j ), in the other one, World j (1). All other encrypt queries are replied to with real ciphertexts in both worlds. For the challenge queries the replies always have the same distribution-r i for the first j − 1 challenge queries and k i for the rest. (In particular, the reply for
It is easy to see that the distribution on the challenger's replies in World j (0) is exactly the same as in World j (0). (The replies to all encrypt, corrupt and challenge queries are decided using the same procedure.) The key observation to make here is that the distribution on the replies in World j (1) is also the same as that in World j (1)! This is true because the keys k i j ,k i j and r i j are generated by the challenger independently of each other, and so, replying to encrypt(i s , i j ) with E k is (k i j ) and challenge(i j ) with r i j (as done in World j (1)) produces the same distribution as replying to the former with E k is (k i j ) and the latter with k i j (as done in World j (1)). Thus, our adversary can differentiate between World j (0) and World j (1) with the same probability as it can differentiate between World j (0) and World j (1).
Why are the two worlds World j (0) and World j (1) indistinguishable? Because the encryption scheme is Ind-CPA-secure. If the adversary can distinguish between two sets of ciphertexts {E k is (k i j )} is∈I(i j ) (the real ones) and {E k is (k i j )} is∈I(i j ) (the fake ones) then it must be able to tell the difference between E k is (k i j ) and E k is (k i j ) for some node i s ∈ I(i j ). (A standard hybrid argument applies here 10 .) This goes against the Ind-CPA-security of Π.
Going beyond l = 1. In the general setting, a node i s , pointing at any node i j ∈ V chal (A) need not be a source-there could be other edges incident upon each such i s and extending the above argument to this general setting requires more work. In order to be able to make a statement like "the ciphertext E k is (k i j ) is indistinguishable from E k is (k i j )", one must first argue that every ciphertext of the form E k i s (k is ) (where i s → i s is an edge in G(A)) looks the same as one of the form E k i s (k is ) (a fake ciphertext). But every such k i s could, in turn, be encrypted under other keys (that is, the node i s could have other edges incident on it). There could be a lot of nodes (O(n), in general) from which i j is reachable in G(A) and at some point or the other, we would need to argue that replying with real ciphertexts created under each of these nodes is the same as replying with fake ones. Worse still, we do not a priori know the set of nodes from which i j can be reached in G(A) since the graph is created adaptively; so we must make guesses in the process.
It is easy to come up with an argument where the amount of guesswork involved is exponential in n (simply guess the entire set of nodes from which there is a path to i j ). In our proof, however, we take a radically different approach. We first define a sequence of hybrid distributions on the replies given to A such that in each of the distributions, the replies corresponding to some of the edges in the key graph are fake, and these "faked" edges are such that their end-points lie on a single path ending in i j . (Henceforth, we will refer to every edge for which the corresponding reply is fake, as a faked edge.) The extreme hybrid distributions are defined as in the two worlds World j (0) and World j (1) for l = 1: in one extreme, the replies corresponding to all edges are real, and in the other extreme, the replies corresponding to all edges incident on i j are fake (while the rest of the replies are still real). Intermediate to these extremes, however, are several distributions in which edges other than those incident on i j are faked. For any two adjacent distributions in the sequence of distributions, the following properties are always satisfied:
(a) The distributions differ in the reply corresponding to a single edge i s → i t ; the reply is real in one distribution while fake in the other.
(b) In both distributions, for every i r ∈ I(i s ), the edge i r → i s is faked.
(c) There exists a path from i t to i j in the key graph and in both distributions, "some" of the edges incident upon this path are faked, the faked edges being the same in both distributions.
(d) No other edge in the key graph is faked in either of the distributions.
Properties (a) and (b) are meant to ensure that any two adjacent hybrids can be simulated using a single left-or-right encryption oracle (and so, A's capability to distinguish between them would imply that the encryption scheme is not Ind-CPA-secure); properties (c) and (d) enable the simulation to be carried out by guessing a path (that goes from i s to i t to i j ) as opposed to guessing all the nodes from which i j is reachable. (This partly explains why our reduction factor is exponential in the depth, rather than the size, of the key graph.) In order to simultaneously achieve all these properties, we order the hybrid distributions such that (i) when the reply for any edge i s → i t is changed (from real to fake or vice versa) in moving from one hybrid to another, all edges of the form i r → i s have already been faked in previous hybrids; and (ii) after 10 The reduction factor in this hybrid argument would be at most n. This combined with the guessing probability (1/n) associated with the node ij defined above gives us a gross reduction factor of O(n 2 ), as desired for l = 1.
changing the reply for i s → i t , there is a sequence of hybrids in which the replies for all edges i r → i s are, step by step, changed back from fake to real. This is done in order to satisfy property (d) above (particularly, to make sure that it is satisfied when the replies for edges issuing from i t are changed in a subsequent hybrid). Thus, if we scan the sequence of hybrid distributions from one extreme to the other, we observe both "real-to-fake" and "fake-to-real" transitions in the replies given to A, taking place in an oscillating manner. The oscillations have a recursive structure-for every oscillation in replies (transition from real to fake and back to real) for an edge i s → i t , there are two oscillations (transition from real to fake to real to fake to real) for every edge i r → i s incident upon i s . Simulating these hybrid distributions (using a left-or-right oracle) and subsequently, arguing that the simulation works correctly is the most challenging part of the proof. After developing an appropriate simulation strategy, we prove its correctness using an inductive argument-assuming that, for some l ≤ l, the simulation behaves correctly whenever i s is at depth smaller than l in the key graph, we show that the simulation is correct also when i s is at depth smaller than l + 1; this simplifies our analysis considerably. The details of the proof are given in the appendix of the paper.
Other Variants. A natural variant of the GSD game would be one in which the adversary is allowed to acquire encryptions of messages of its choice (besides receiving encryptions of keys, as in the original game). Consider the following modified version of the game: A issues encrypt and corrupt queries, as before, but instead of making challenge queries, it makes queries of the form encrypt msg(i, m 0 , m 1 ) (such that m 0 , m 1 ∈ {0, 1} * and |m 0 | = |m 1 |). In return for each such query, the challenger sends it the ciphertext E k i (m b ). A legitimate adversary in this modified game would be one whose key graph is always a DAG and for whom every query encrypt msg(i, m 0 , m 1 ) is such that i is unreachable from the corrupt nodes in the DAG. (Note: i need not be a sink in the DAG.) We remark that a result analogous to Theorem 2.4 can also be proven for this modified game, and with only a slight modification to the proof of that theorem. Specifically, we can show that if Π is (t, )-Ind-CPA secure, then for any t -time (n, e, l) adversary A (t as defined in Theorem 2.4),
A different variant of our game would be one in which A is provided encryptions of messages, but these messages are sampled by the challenger using some fixed distribution known to A. In this variant, the messages themselves can be thought of as nodes (more specifically, sinks) in the key graph, whose values are hidden from A but whose probability distribution is defined differently from that of the keys. The goal now would be to argue that from A's perspective, all "unopened" messages (that is, messages that are not reachable from corrupt nodes in the key graph) appear as good as fresh samples from the same message space. If we assume that messages are sampled independently of each other, then security in this variant can also be proven, and with almost the same reduction factor as in Theorem 2.4. (Specifically, the reduction factor would be (3/2) · M n(2n + 1) l , where M is an upper bound on the total number of messages that are encrypted.) However, in the absence of this assumption, it becomes considerably more challenging to prove the same claim. The techniques developed in this paper do not allow us to argue about security in such a setting, not even in the case where the key graph has depth 0 (only messages, and not keys, are used as plaintexts) 11 .
The Application
In this section, we illustrate how our result from Section 2 applies to the security analysis of multicast encryption protocols.
Multicast Encryption. A group of n users, labeled U 1 , · · · , U n , share a broadcast channel and wish to use it for secure communication with each other. At any point in time t, only a subset of users, labeled S t , are "logged in" to the network, that is, are authorized to receive information sent on the channel. We would like to ensure that for all t, only the users in S t (called group members) be able to decipher the broadcasts. We assume the existence of a central group manager C who shares a unique long-lived key k U i with each user U i 12 and runs a key distribution program, KD, in order to accomplish the said task. The manager (or, equivalently, the program KD) receives user login and logout requests 13 and for the request at time t, sends out a set of rekey messages, M t , on the channel. These rekey messages carry information about a key k[t] (the group key for t), and are such that only the group members can decipher them (and, subsequently, recover k[t] ). The key k[t] can then be used to carry out all group-specific security tasks until the next login/logout request arrives, which, we assume, happens at time t + 1. For example, it can be used for ensuring privacy of all data sent between time t and t + 1 and/or guaranteeing "group authenticity" of data (that is, enabling members to verify that the sender of the data is a group member at time t, and not an outsider). To ensure security of any such task, it is important to guarantee that k[t] appears pseudorandom to users not in S t (the non-members) for all instants t, even when such users can collude with each other and share all their information. The problem is to design the program KD in a manner such that this guarantee is achieved.
Fiat and Naor [FN93] were the first to define this problem formally and they introduced it under the title of broadcast encryption-a formulation in which all users are assumed to be stateless and group members are required to be able to recover k[t], given only M t and their long-lived keys. Subsequent work (for example, [Mit97, WGL00]) lifted the problem to the more general setting of stateful users, and studied it in the context of ensuring privacy in multicast groups on the Internet (hence the name multicast encryption). LKH is a protocol that relies on the statefulness assumption.
The Protocol. A trivial approach to multicast key distribution would be to have the center generate a new, purely random key k[t] for every group membership change, and to let M t (the rekey messages for time t) be the set of ciphertexts obtained by encrypting k[t] individually under the long-lived keys of every user in S t , that is, the set {E k U i (k[t])} U i ∈St . This, however, is an unscalable solution since it involves a linear communication overhead per membership change, which is prohibitive for most applications that use multicast.
The LKH protocol betters the above trivial approach by distributing to users, in addition to the group key, a set of auxiliary keys, with each auxiliary key being given to some subset of the of two sets of values-in one world, reveal the real values of all unopened messages, and in the other, provide an equal number of messages that are sampled from the probability space of the unopnened messages, conditioned on the values of the already-opened messages. Now show that A cannot distinguish between these two worlds. This problem is essentially the same as the version of the selective decryption problem where plaintexts are not assumed to be independent of each other. We don't know of any solution to the problem yet.
12 In practice, such long-lived keys could be established during the first login request made by users using, say, public-key based approaches.
13 In some scenarios, the logout operations may be "forced"; that is, the manager may proactively revoke some user(s) (as a punishment for not paying subscription fees in time and/or indulging in piracy). current group members. All keys in the system are organized in the form of a hierarchy-the group key is associated with the root node in the hierarchy, the long-lived keys of users with the leaves, and the auxiliary keys with internal nodes. At each point in time t, a user U i ∈ S t knows all keys on the path from the leaf node corresponding to k U i to the root node (which corresponds to k[t]). The protocol maintains this property as an invariant across membership changes.
Rekey Messages. For simplicity, we illustrate the protocol using an example where n = 8 and the key hierarchy is binary. (So the height of the hierarchy is log 2 (8) = 3.) We assume that all parties (including the center) have blackbox access to a symmetric-key encryption scheme Π = (E, D) with key space {0, 1} η for some fixed security parameter η. In our description, we use the terms "keys" and "nodes" interchangeably (the relation between them is obvious in the current context) and depict transmission of a ciphertext E k 1 (k 2 ) with an edge k 1 → k 2 in the figures.
Suppose that initially (t = 0), the set of group members S 0 = {U 1 , U 2 , U 3 , U 6 , U 7 } as shown in Figure 1 (a). The center's key distribution program KD generates the initial group key k[0] = k (the root node) and all auxiliary keys (internal nodes) which are supposed to be given to users in S 0 . For example, since k 00 and k 0 lie on the path from k U 1 to k[0], these keys must be generated afresh and sent securely to U 1 . KD transmits the keys to the designated users by sending the ciphertexts shown by dark edges in the figure. So, for example, user U 1 can obtain all the keys it is supposed to know (k 00 , k 0 , k ) by decrypting, in order, the ciphertexts
Now suppose that at time t = 1, user U 1 logs out of the group. That is, S 1 = {U 2 , U 3 , U 6 , U 7 }. The program KD should re-generate the group key k , and the auxiliary keys which were known to U 1 at t = 0 (k 00 and k 0 ) and distribute the new values in a manner such that U 1 cannot recover them but other users who are required to do so (according to the protocol invariant) still can. Specifically, it generates new keys k 1 00 , k 1 0 and k 1 =: k[1] (independently and uniformly at random) and sends out the ciphertexts shown in figure 1(b) . Thus, every rekey operation for a user logout requires sending logarithmically many (specifically, 2 log 2 (n) − 1) ciphertexts; in our example, this number is 5.
The Flaw and the Fix. The flaw in the original LKH protocol lies in the way it implements rekeying for user login operations. Suppose U 8 sends a login request at time t = 2. The center must now re-generate keys k 11 , k 1 , k and send them securely to all the designated users (including U 8 ). The protocol does this by transmitting the ciphertexts shown in figure 1(c).
(k 2 11 , k 2 1 , k 2 denote the newly generated keys.) Sending the old values of any of these keys, even the auxiliary ones, to U 8 (that is, encrypted under the key k U 8 ) could potentially allow U 8 to recover past group keys, which must be prevented. (For example, if only the group key was generated afresh and the keys k 1 , k 11 were transmitted to U 8 as is (though encrypted under k U 8 ), U 8 could use k 1 and the transmissions at t = 1 to recover k[1].) For this reason, LKH generates fresh values for k 11 and k 1 in our example.
Note that the group key at t = 1, k[1] = k 1 , is used to encrypt the group key at t = 2, k 2 . This is a problem since our initial goal was to guarantee pseudorandomness of all group keys but deploying k[1] in this manner clearly fails that purpose. In principle, if k[1] is used in keying other applications (for example, in a message authentication scheme) at t = 1, and is also used for rekeying in the manner shown, then the protocol could be completely subverted (both the keys k[1] and k[2] fully recovered) even by a passive eavesdropper on the channel. Of course, this does not mean that the protocol is broken for any secure implementation of the encryption scheme; but for some (albeit contrived ones), it is.
We propose to fix the LKH protocol by changing the rekeying procedure for user logins as shown in Figure 1(d) . (We remark that this fix is different from the one suggested in [MP06].) Notice that the communication cost incurred is the same as in the original protocol (2 log 2 (n) ciphertexts for a user space of size n). Notice also that the structure of the rekey messages is now similar to that of the messages sent upon a user logout request ( figure 1(b) ). We refer to this modified version of LKH as "rLKH" (the r stands for "repaired"). The protocol can be easily generalized to work with arbitrary hierarchies (as opposed to the binary one in our example); in particular, when the key hierarchy is a d-ary tree (so its height equals log d (n) ), the communication complexity (number of ciphertexts transmitted) of rekeying would be d log d (n) for user logins and d log d (n) − 1 for user logouts. An implementation of rLKH with n users and a d-ary hierarchy is referred to as the (n, d)-instance of the protocol.
One could conceive other ways of fixing the user login process of LKH (possibly as secure and as efficient as the one we propose). We prefer this fix for various reasons: (a) the key hierarchy in rLKH has the nice property that at all instants, every auxiliary key (and even the group key) is transmitted to the legitimate recipients by encrypting it under its two children only (and no other keys). This property could potentially simplify implementation of the protocol in practice. (b) rekeying is possible using encryption alone (without requiring other cryptographic primitives); thus, the security of the protocol rests upon the secure implementation of a single primitive, which, we believe, makes for good cryptographic design; (c) most importantly, our fix ensures that the depth of the key graph generated by all ciphertexts remains logarithmic in the size of the group (does not grow with time); this property is useful in arguing about the protocol's adaptive security.
Adaptive Security. Let KD be an n-user multicast key distribution program. We define adaptive security of KD using the following game (which we call the MKD game) played between an adversary A and a challenger B. Initially, B generates the long-lived keys of all users k U 1 , · · · , k Un (randomly, independently from the underlying key space) and also generates a random challenge bit b. A specifies the initial set of group members, S 0 , in response to which KD is invoked and the initial key distribution messages, M 0 , returned to A. Subsequently, A issues multiple queries to B, each query being either:
1. a rekey query-at any instant t, A can issue a query of the form rekey(command, U i ) where command is either login or logout. In response, B runs KD based on the membership change command specified and returns the set of rekey messages M t to A; OR 2. a corrupt query-A can also issue queries of the form corrupt(U j ), in return for which B sends it the key k U j ; OR 3. a challenge query-finally, A can issue a challenge query at any instant t; in response, it is given the key k[t] if b = 0, or a fresh key r[t] (sampled independently and uniformly at random from {0, 1} η ) if b = 1.
All queries can be issued interleavingly and adaptively. Let U corr (A) be the set of all users corrupted by A during the game. Let T chal (A) be the set of instants t at which A issues a challenge query. We say that A is legitimate if in every execution of A in the MKD game, its queries satisfy:
denote the random variable corresponding to the output of A in the game, conditioned on the event that B selects b as the challenge bit.
Definition 3.1 Let t, r ∈ IN + and 0 < < 1. A multicast key distribution program KD is (t, r, )-secure against adaptive adversaries if for every legitimate adversary A that runs in time t, and makes r rekey queries:
On the lines of the above definition, one can also define the problem of multicast encryption (or, for that matter, any security task based on multicast key distribution). For example, consider a multicast encryption protocol ME constructed using a key distribution program KD and an encryption scheme Π = (E, D) as follows: the protocol distributes rekey messages for every group membership change just as KD but besides this, it also encrypts arbitrary messagesupon receiving a message m to encrypt at time t, the protocol outputs E k[t] (m). Security of such a scheme can be defined using a game similar to the MKD game, but with one changeevery time the adversary issues a challenge query, it also specifies two messages (m 0 , m 1 ) (m 0 , m 1 ∈ {0, 1} * , and |m 0 | = |m 1 |) and the challenger replies with E k[t] (m b ) (k[t] being the current group key). It is possible to show that if KD is (t, r, )-secure against adaptive adversaries, and Π is (t, )-Ind-CPA secure, then ME is (O(t), r, 2 + )-secure against adaptive adversaries.
In general, the problems of multicast key distribution and multicast encryption are equivalent to each other but studying the key distribution problem is more natural since it allows to generically build protocols for any security task (not necessarily multicast encryption) that can be accomplished using shared group keys. For this reason, we have focussed our attention on the key distribution problem alone, and discuss the security of rLKH in the same context. Theorem 3.2 Let n, d, t, r ∈ IN + such that 1 < d ≤ n. Let 0 < < 1. The (n, d)-instance of rLKH, when implemented using a (t, )-Ind-CPA secure encryption scheme Π, is (t , r , )-secure against adaptive adversaries for
Here,ñ = max{n, d log d (n) −1 + r } and t GenKey (resp. t Encrypt ) is the time taken to perform key generation (resp. encryption) in Π.
The proof of this theorem follows almost immediately from our soundness result of Section 2, given that (a) the key graph generated by any execution of rLKH is acyclic; (b) all group keys correspond to sinks in the protocol key graph; (c) the depth of the graph remains log d (n) throughout; and (d) for any r -round execution of the protocol, and for all t ≤ r , the group key k[t] can be reached from a long-lived key k U i if and only if U i ∈ S t . (The last part can be proven using a straightforward inductive argument, with the induction being performed on r .) The reduction factor given in the theorem is slightly better than what one gets using a direct invocation of Theorem 2.4: this is achieved using the fact that in any r -round execution of the rLKH protocol, (a) a key at depth i in the key graph (that is, at distance i from some source) is encrypted only by keys at depth i − 1 and (b) there are at most d log d (n) −1 + r keys at any depth in the graph (and at most n sources in it). Note that our reduction factor is exponential in log d (n) which is independent of the number of rounds the protocol is executed for. That is, the adaptive security of rLKH degrades polynomially (and not exponentially) with the number of rounds in the protocol execution.
Changing the hierarchy structure in rLKH involves a natural trade-off between efficiency and security: If we increase the arity d of the hierarchy (and correspondingly, reduce the height), the communication efficiency of the protocol suffers, but we get a better guarantee on its adaptive security. The extreme case is the n-ary hierarchy that has a linear rekeying communication complexity but provides adaptive security via a reduction factor of only O(ñ 2 ). (Note that this is exactly the trivial approach to key distribution we discussed earlier on.) Whether or not one can further improve this trade-off between efficiency and security across different instances of rLKH, and, in particular, prove its adaptive security via a reduction factor smaller than the one given in Theorem 3.2, assuming only the semantic security of Π, is a question left open by this work. 
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A Proof of Theorem 2.4
Let A be a legitimate (n, e, l)-adversary playing the GSD game, and suppose that the encryption scheme Π in the game is (t, )-Ind-CPA secure. Suppose that A runs in time t and is able to win the game with advantage greater than (t and as defined in Theorem 2.4); that is, suppose that
Given such an adversary, we will construct another adversary A that runs in time t and, using blackbox access to A, is able to break the encryption scheme Π with advantage greater than . That is, we will construct an A with the property that
This would contradict the (t, ) security of Π, hence implying that our assumption about A was incorrect.
A.1 The Reduction
For any positive integer i, we use [i] to denote the set {1, · · · , i}. Any path in the graph G(A) generated by A can be represented using a sequence of length l + 1 as follows: First, write down the nodes in the path in the order of their occurrence from start to end. Then, if the path is of length smaller than l (has fewer than l + 1 nodes), prepend this sequence with a 0 as many times as is required to make its length equal l + 1. For example, a path i 1 → i 2 → i 3 (with 2 edges only) would be represented under this convention as:
We say that a sequence of values from {0, 1, · · · , n} is a valid path in G(A) if it is a representation (defined as above) of a path that exists in G(A).
Our construction of the adversary A is organized in two parts. In the first part, called the setup phase (Figure 2) , A generates all keys required to reply to A's queries and some other random values which are used to form the replies. (The italicized comments embedded in Figure 2 give some intuition about the semantics of these random values.) The second part of A -the execution phase-which is shown in Figure 3 , is the one in which A runs A (in a blackbox manner) and simulates replies to all its queries; the replies to some of the queries (namely, queries of the form encrypt(s, x) where s is as decided in the setup phase) are given using the left-or-right oracle O Π k,b . It is easy to check that the running time of A is bounded from above by t + O(n) · t GenKey + e · t Encrypt , which is the same as the quantity t in Theorem 2.4.
Phase I: Setup (Generating keys and preparing to reply to A's queries) 001. Sample l − 1 numbers u 0 , u 1 , · · · , u l−2 independently from the set {0, 1, 2, · · · , n} such that for each j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , l − 2}, the following holds:
Sample u l−1 and u l independently and uniformly at random from [n] . (The sequence (u 0 , u 1 , · · · , u l ) is A 's "guess" for a path; a successful execution of A will be one in which this sequence is a valid path in G(A). Note that we do not rule out repetitions amongst the u j 's-it is possible that u j = u j for some j = jeven though the resulting sequences are bound to be invalid. This is done only for the sake of simplicity. (The reduction factor is not significantly improved by avoiding this triviality.) The choice for the specific distribution of the u j 's defined above will be clearer after seeing the analysis of A .) 002. Let u s be the first non-zero value in the sequence (u 0 , u 1 , · · · , u l−1 , u l ).
(u s is the start node of the path guessed by A . While replying to A's queries, A will associate the key k used by its encryption oracle O Π k,b , with u s . Note that s ≤ l − 1 always.) 004. Generate keys k 1 , · · · , k us−1 , k us+1 , · · · , k n randomly and independently from {0, 1} η . Also generate (random, independent) keys r us , r u s+1 , · · · , r u l from the same space.
(The r i 's are used in creating "fake" ciphertexts in the execution phase.) 
A.2 The Analysis.
For any execution of A, the transcript of that execution is the sequence of queries made by and replies given to A; formally, it is the sequence (q 1 , r 1 , q 2 , r 2 , · · · , q f , r f ), where f is the total number of queries made by A in that execution, and for every i ∈ {1, · · · , f }, q i is the ith query of A and r i is the reply received for q i . The view of A, given a fixed procedure for deciding replies to its queries, is the distribution over all possible transcripts that can be generated by executing A and replying to it using the said procedure. The variables G(A), V chal (A) and V corr (A) are all functions of the view of A, that is, their distribution depends not only on the coins used by A but also on the procedure used to reply to A's queries. For the most of our analysis, we will be concerned with the view of A in its interaction with A , that is, when the procedure for replying to A's queries is as shown in figures 2 and 3. Thus, unless otherwise specified, G(A), V chal (A), V corr (A) should be treated as random variables defined for this particular view. 
If y = u s , Reply with E kx (r us ). (Since A does not know the value of k-the key associated with u s -its reply to every edge x → u s created by A is a fake ciphertext.) 240.
For every j ∈ {s, · · · , l − 1}, do the following: 241.
If
The case x = u s , y = u s+1 is addressed above) Set seen[j] to be true.
If none of the above conditions are satisfied, reply with E kx (k y ).
300. When A issues a query corrupt(x), do the followingIf x = u s , return k x to A. If x = u s , output a random bit. Halt! 400. When A issues a query challenge(x), do the followingReply with k x if either of the following is true: (a) x = u l . (b) x = u l but the query challenge(u l ) has been made (and replied to) already. Otherwise, reply with a fresh, random sample from {0, 1} η . (We stress that the reply for the query challenge(u l ) is always k u l . Also, until the query challenge(u l ) is made, the reply to every query of the from challenge(x) is a random value, sampled independently of k x .) (Following are some "bad" conditions under which A fails in its simulation.) 500. If at any point during or after the execution of A, it is found that:
(a) (u 0 , · · · , u l ) is not a valid path in G(A); OR (b) u l / ∈ V chal (A), Then output a random bit. Halt! 600. In the end, output whatever A outputs. Let Bad be the event that A 's simulation of replies to A's queries is unsuccessful, that is, the values u 0 , · · · , u l that it selects are such that:
is not a valid path in G(A).
Roughly speaking, the occurrence of Bad is computationally independent of the choice of the bit b for otherwise we would be contradicting the Ind-CPA security of Π. This is formalized in the following proposition:
The proof uses a straightforward reduction argument. Suppose that the statement is false, that is, ∆ Bad > . Modify the code of A slightly such that if at any point during the simulation of A the event Bad occurs, the code outputs 1 (instead of a purely random bit). The resulting code gives us an adversary that defies the (t, ) security of Π. Let O A denote the event that A outputs 1 when given access to a left-or-right oracle O Π k,b . Our goal is to bound the Ind-CPA advantage of A , which can now be re-written as
Let us expand this quantity based on the occurrence/non-occurrence of event Bad. Below and for the rest of the proof, we use the shorthand A; B to denote A ∧ B for any two events A and B.
(Follows from Prop. A.1)
. Inequality 3 can be re-written in terms of ∆ as follows:
We will now focus our attention on bounding the quantity ∆. Let
We will aim to show that:
From this, the theorem would follow immediately using the following chain of inequalities:
which is what our initial goal-inequality 2-was.
A.2.1 Proof of Lemma A.2
Let O A be the event that A completes the execution of A successfully (event Bad does not occur) and the latter outputs 1 after termination. Observe that if Bad is known not to occur, the events O A and O A are exactly the same; that is,
Using this observation, we can re-write ∆ as
Let G denote the event Bad. (G stands for Good.) We will first break up this event into l mutually exclusive events G 0 , G 1 , · · · , G l−1 as follows: for each j ∈ {0, · · · , l − 1}, define G j as the event that the values u 0 , u 1 , · · · , u l selected by A satisfy the following three conditions:
(In other words, the value of s decided in line 002 of A 's setup phase is j.)
Condition (c), together with (b), implies that for all j ∈ {j, j + 1, · · · , l}, u j = 0. It is fairly obvious that for any distinct j and j (in {0, · · · , l − 1}), G j and G j are mutually exclusive and that G = l−1 j=0 G j . For each j ∈ {0, · · · , l − 1}, define the following quantity
∆ can be expressed in terms of these quantities as follows:
We will now work towards breaking down the events G 0 , · · · , G l−1 further and correspondingly, expressing the ∆ j 's as summations of more detailed terms. For this, we need some more definitions.
Consider A's interaction with A . For any of the values u j selected by A , we denote (the random variable corresponding to) the in-degree of u j in the graph G(A) created during this interaction by Indegree(u j ). (If u j = 0, we define Indegree(u j ) to be 0.) We think of nodes in V chal (A) to be ordered according to their occurrence as arguments of challenge queries; so, in the sequel, whenever we say that u l is "the i l th node in V chal (A)", we imply that challenge(u l ) is the i l th among all challenge queries received by A from A. Likewise, for any two values u j−1 , u j , whenever we say that u j−1 is "the i j th node pointing at u j ", we mean that encrypt(u j−1 , u j ) is the i j th query of the form encrypt(x, u j ) received by A .
For
(i,i l ,··· ,i j ) denote the event that (a) G j−1 occurs; and (b) V chal (A) has size d and u l is the ith node in it; and (c) for each j ∈ {j, j + 1, · · · , l}, Indegree(u j ) = d j and u j −1 is the i j th node pointing at u j in G(A).
The events G 0 , G 1 , · · · , G l−1 can quite easily be expressed in terms of events of the above type. For any j ∈ {0, · · · , l − 1}, G j occurs if and only if the size of V chal (A) equals d for some d ∈ [n], and u l is the ith node in V chal (A) for some i ∈ [d] and has non-zero in-degree d l for some d l in [n] , and u l−1 is the i l th node pointing at u l in G(A) for some i l ∈ [d l ], and so on, all the way upto u j . Put succinctly, for any j ∈ {0, · · · , l − 1}:
are mutually exclusive, and so
We will now show how to sum up this quantity with j ranging from 0 through l − 1 and to express the sum (which is the same as ∆) in terms of ∆ GSD (A). Towards this, we first define another type of event, similar to (but slightly more involved than) the Ψ's.
Let j be any arbitrary number in [l] . For any sequence of bits
(a) For somej ∈ {0, 1, · · · , j − 1}, the event Gj occurs and Indegree(uj) = 0 (b) V chal (A) has size d and u l is the ith node in it;
(c) For each j ∈ {j, j + 1, · · · , l}, Indegree(u j ) = d j , u j −1 is the i j th node pointing at u j in G(A) and the following holds:
• If ν j −1 = 0, A receives the real reply for encrypt(u j −1 , u j ), that is, E ku j −1 (k u j ).
• If ν j −1 = 1, A receives a fake reply for the same query, that is, E ku j −1 (r u j ).
(d) For each j ∈ {j +1, · · · , j −1}, u j −1 is the first node pointing at u j and A receives the real reply for the query encrypt(
The last condition is equivalent to saying that A receives the real reply for every query of the form encrypt(x, u j ) where j < j. (To see this, observe line 242 in A 's code-A 's reply to each query of this form succeeding encrypt(u j −1 , u j ) is always real.) We use Θ first and Θ last to denote the following events:
In words, Θ first (resp. Θ last ) is the event that for somej ∈ {0, · · · , l − 1}, Gj occurs and Indegree(uj) = 0, that u l is the first (resp. last) node in V chal (A), that u l−1 is the first (resp. last) node pointing at u l in G(A), that the reply A receives for the query encrypt(u l−1 , u l ) is a real ciphertext (resp. a fake one) and, finally, that the reply A receives for every query of the form encrypt(x, u j ) (j < j < l) is a real ciphertext. The view of A under the occurrence of either Θ first or Θ last are, in fact, quite similar to the replies the challenger B provides to A in the GSD game.
In the following claim, we relate the probabilities of the events Θ first and Θ last to the quantity α defined in equation 4.
The proof of these claims are postponed to Sections A.2.2 and A.2.3 respectively. We will now illustrate how the two types of events we have defined hitherto-the Ψ's and the Θ's-are related to each other. This will help us sum up the ∆ j 's (as defined in equation 6), express the sum in terms of Θ first and Θ last , and thus relate it to ∆ GSD (A).
Before we explain the relation between the Ψ's and the Θ's, we need one last set of notations. For any bitvector − → ν j and any bit value ν ∈ {0, 1}, let ν · − → ν j denote the bitvector formed by prepending ν to − → ν j , and let XOR(ν, − → ν j ) be defined as follows:
(i,i l ,··· ,i j ) ( − → ν j−1 ) occurs and Indegree(u j−1 ) = 0.
For any two events E 1 and E 2 , we use E 1 = E 2 to denote an assertion that E 1 and E 2 are identical events (that is, E 1 occurs if and only if E 2 occurs) and E 1 E 2 to denote that the view of A in its interaction with A given E 1 occurs is identically distributed as its view given E 2 occurs. Let E 1 ≡ E 2 denote that E 1 E 2 and P[
It is easy to check that if
Lemma A.5 (Hybrid Cancellation Lemma)
. Fix ν l−1 = 0. Let ν be any arbitrary bit value and let (b = ν) denote the event that the oracle O Π k,b (provided to A ) selects ν to be the value of b. Then, for all j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , l},
The proof of this lemma is given in Section A.2.4. The next lemma invokes the above lemma and uses it to sum up the ∆ j 's, step by step, in an inductive manner. For any j ∈ {0, · · · , l − 1}, let
The proof of this lemma is given in Section A.2.5. Given these two lemmas and Claims A.3 and A.4, the final result (Lemma A.2) is quite easy to prove. Using Lemma A.6, equation 5 can be re-written as:
(Follows from the hybrid cancellation lemma, Lemma A.5, part 2)
(Follows from the hybrid cancellation lemma, part 1)
Now invoking Claims A.3 and A.4, we get
> α 2 (Follows from our initial assumption, inequality 1)
In the remainder of the appendix, we will give the proofs of all the lemmas and claims used to prove Lemma A.2.
A.2.2 Proof of Claim A.3
We will argue that A's view in its interaction with A given the occurrence of Θ first (resp. Θ last ) is distributed identically as its view in the GSD game when the challenge bit b (chosen by B) is 0 (resp. 1). From this, the claim will follow immediately.
When Θ first occurs, every query of A of the form encrypt(x, y) is replied to with a real ciphertext (E kx (k y )) and that of the form challenge(x) is replied to with k x -exactly the manner in which replies are created when b = 0 in the GSD game. Why is this? To see why the former is true, note that under the occurence of Θ first , the only queries that could be replied to with fake ciphertexts are those of the form encrypt(x, u l ) and either the same as or preceding the query encrypt(u l−1 , u l ). But, given Θ first occurs, u l−1 is the first node pointing at u l and the reply to encrypt(u l−1 , u l ) is real, thus implying that the replies for all encrypt queries of A are real. To see why the latter is true, note that the reply to every query challenge(x), including or succeeding challenge(u l ) is always k x (line 400 of A 's code), and when Θ first occurs, challenge(u l ) is the first challenge query.
When Θ last happens, things are a bit less straightforward. As above, the only queries whose replies could be faked by A are those of the form encrypt(x, u l ), either including or preceding encrypt(u l−1 , u l ). However, under the occurrence of Θ last , encrypt(u l−1 , u l ) is the last query of this form, and even the reply for encrypt(u l−1 , u l ) is fake, thus implying that every query of the form encrypt(x, u l ) is replied to in a fake manner (specifically, with E kx (r u l )). Note also that given Θ last , challenge(u l ) is the last challenge query, and thus, the reply to all challenge(x) queries except challenge(u l ) is a random key, sampled independently of k x . For challenge(u l ), the reply is k u l . Now comes the crucial part: Replying to the query challenge(u l ) with k u l and to every query of the form encrypt(x, u l ) with E kx (r u l )-where r u l is independent of (but identically distributed as) k u l -produces the same distribution on the replies as replying to challenge(u l ) with r u l and to every query of the form encrypt(x, u l ) with E kx (k u l ). Plus, we know that neither k u l nor r u l can be used in creating any other replies for A (other than those of the form encrypt(x, u l ) or challenge(u l )). In effect, the replies that A provides to A conditioned on event Θ last , are distributed exactly as B's replies when b = 1 in the GSD game-real ciphertexts for all encrypt queries and a random key (independent of k x ) for every query of the form challenge(x).
A.2.3 Proof of Claim A.4
We will prove that P[Θ first ] = α/2; the proof for the other part of the claim (namely, P[Θ last ] = α/2) is quite similar and is omitted.
Some notations first. Recall that in any execution of A, the graph G(A) and the set V chal (A) are random variables dependent on the coins used by A and those used in the procedure for replying to A's queries. We define here some more random variables related to G(A) and V chal (A) and the manner in which these are created in any execution.
• Let fchal be the random variable corresponding to the first node in V chal (A).
• For any fixed w ∈ [n], let fnode(w) be the random variable corresponding to the first node pointing at w in G(A).
• For any fixed w ∈ [n], let fpath(w) be the random variable corresponding to the path in G(A) that ends in w, that starts in a source (of G(A)) and is such that for every edge x → y in the path, x = fnode(y). Let flen(w) be the length of fpath(w) (that is, the number of edges in it).
Since G(A) is always acyclic, fpath(w) and flen(w) are well-defined (and uniquely so) for every value of w ∈ [n] and every value assigned to G(A).
Let us now consider the event Θ first and re-phrase it in terms of the above definitions. Θ first occurs if and only if in A's interaction with A , the variables
The last condition ensures that the replies that A provides to A for all queries of the form encrypt(u j , u j+1 ) (j ≥ s) are real ciphertexts. (How so? For this, first observe that the reply for any query encrypt(u j , u j+1 ), for j > s, is real if and only if b j = b j−1 and that for the query encrypt(u s , u s+1 ) is real if and only if b = b s . Then notice that b l−1 = 0 always, which means that for Θ first to occur, all the other b j 's and the bit b must also be zero.)
The probability that Θ first occurs is thus:
be events defined as follows:
can now be written succinctly as follows:
14 Throughout the proof of Claim A.4 and Lemma A.5, we denote paths in G(A) as sequences of nodes, but without any zeroes prepended to the first node.
15 While expressing Θ last in terms of fchal , fnode(·), fpath(·) etc., the first two conditions and the last condition must be suitably modified (u l must be the last node in V chal (A), u l−1 must be the last node pointing at u l and b, bs, · · · , b l−2 must all equal 1) while the other conditions remain the same as above.
Let us first compute
] for any arbitrary l and − → w . Notice that the values
are all generated by A independently of each other and of the bit b chosen by A 's oracle O Π k,b . Using this fact, computing P[E
] is quite straightforward:
(To understand this step, observe the probability distribution associated with the u j 's in line 001 of figure 2)
Plugging this into the expression for P[Θ first ], we get:
We will now focus on the quantity P[E
]. Let us denote this quantity by p. Our goal will be to show that the sum
p is equal to one. From this, the claim will follow immediately.
Proving S p = 1: Fix l and − → w . A transcript of A's execution is called a good transcript if the
occurs during that execution; it is called bad otherwise. (Note: "Goodness" is a concept well-defined for any execution of A, not necessarily one involving interaction with A .) Given a transcript of A's execution, it is easy to tell whether it is good or not-simply check if the queries contained in it satisfy the following conditions: (i) fchal = w l ; (ii) fnode(w l ) = w l−1 ; (iii) flen(w l−1 ) = l ; and (iv) fpath(w l−1 ) = (w l−l −1 , · · · , w l−1 ). This essentially boils down to verifying that: (a) challenge(w l ) is the first challenge query made by A; (b) for every j ∈ {l−l , · · · , l−1}, encrypt(w j−1 , w j ) is the first query of the form encrypt(x, w j ) made by A; and (c) no query of the form encrypt(x, w l−l −1 ) is ever made by A.
A bad query in a transcript t is one that violates any of the above conditions; that is, a query q i ∈ t is bad if
• q i = challenge(x) for some x = w l and the query challenge(w l ) does not occur before it in t; or
• q i = encrypt(x, w j ) (for some j ∈ {l − l , · · · , l − 1} and x = w j−1 ) and the query encrypt(w j−1 , w j ) does not occur before it in t; or
• q i is of the form encrypt(x, w l−l −1 ). 16
Clearly, every bad transcript contains at least one bad query. The longest good prefix of a bad transcript t = (q 1 , r 1 , · · · , q f , r f ) is the sequence (q 1 , r 1 , · · · , q i , r i ) (i < f ) such that the queries q 1 , · · · , q i are all good but the query q i+1 is bad. (Note: The longest good prefix of a bad transcript could possibly be empty-the very first query in the transcript could be bad.)
For any transcript t, the relevant transcript corresponding to t, rel (t), is defined as follows: if t is good, rel (t) = t, else rel (t) is the longest good prefix of t. Note that relevant transcripts contain only good queries. For any multiset of transcripts, T , let rel (T ) denote the multiset of relevant transcripts corresponding to T ; that is, rel (T ) = {rel (t) | t ∈ T }. An execution of A is called relevant if it yields a relevant transcript. (Here, when we say "execution", we also refer to partial executions of A, that is, executions upto a certain query, e.g. the first bad query, made by A.)
Now let us consider A's interaction with A . Suppose that the event E
is known to have occurred, which means that s (computed in line 003 of A ) is equal to
denote the multiset of all possible transcripts that can be generated given E
; thus, the size of
, say t, is equal to the number of possible assignments to the random variables k 1 , · · · , k us−1 , k us+1 , · · · , k n and r us , · · · , r u l (generated by A in line 004), the key k (generated by O Π k,b ), the randomness, r E , used in performing all encryption operations, and, finally, the random coins, r A , used by A. Some of the transcripts in
are good while others are bad, and the quantity p we defined earlier on is the ratio of the number of good transcripts in
to t.
Consider the multiset rel (T
). There are two interesting features of this multiset:
), none of the replies given to the adversary involve the random variables r us , r us+1 , · · · , r u l at all. Why is this? Given that E
occurs, these variables could be used in replying to queries either of the form encrypt(x, w s ), or else of the form encrypt(x, w j ) (j ∈ {s + 1, · · · , l}) provided the latter type of queries are made before encrypt(w j−1 , w j ). But any such query would be a bad query, and, by definition, transcripts in rel
) don't contain such queries! Thus, every relevant execution of A in its interaction with A given E
is completely determined by an assignment to k 1 , · · · , k us−1 , k us := k, k us+1 , · · · , k n , and to r E and r A .
denote the multiset of transcripts containing one transcript for each such
contains the same transcripts as in rel
) but is smaller than it, because we ignore the r u i 's while enumerating these transcripts.)
, the replies given for a query of the form encrypt(x, y) is a real ciphertext (that is, E kx (k y )) and that of the form challenge(x) is a real key (that is, k x ). This is exactly the manner in which replies to queries are created in the GSD game, conditioned on the event that the challenge bit b equals 0! Thus, if we were to consider only relevant executions of A, the view of A in the GSD game given b = 0 has the same distribution as its view in its interaction with A given E
occurs.
It follows that the quantity p is equal to the probability that event E
takes place when b = 0 in the GSD game. S p simply sums this probability over all possible values of l and − → w and must thus be equal to 1.
A.2.4 Proof of the Hybrid Cancellation Lemma (Lemma A.5)
Let us first set up some notation that will be useful throughout the lemma. We think of the interaction between A and A as a game in which A makes multiple queries and A replies to these queries in some prescribed manner based on the random variables
(and other randomness involved in generating keys, and forming ciphertexts). We denote this game by Game 0 . Throughout the proof of the lemma, we will be considering various modifications of this game and making statements of the sort: "the probability that event E occurs in Game 0 is the same as the probability that E occurs in some modified version of Game 0 ". To formalize such statements, we adopt the following convention: For any event E, P[E] denotes the probability that E occurs in Game 0 , while for any modification of Game 0 , say Game , the probability that E occurs in Game is denoted by P Game [E] . 
d,i as follows:
Now consider the following modified version of Game 0 , which we denote by Game i . In this modification, A first generates keys k 1 , · · · , k n (Note: All keys are generated) and, subsequently, replies to all encrypt queries using real ciphertexts, just as in the GSD game. The responses to all corrupt queries are also just as they are in the GSD game. For the challenge queries, however, A does the following-it replies to the first i queries of the form challenge(x) with a random element of {0, 1} η , sampled independently of k x , while to the other queries of this form, its reply is k x . We claim that the view of A in Game 0 given E (0))). The other part is somewhat more non-trivial and we will prove it in greater detail.
Given that event E
d,i occurs, the replies that A provides to A (in Game 0 ) are decided as follows:
(a) for each query of the form challenge(x) that is issued before the ith challenge querywhich is the same as challenge(u l )-the reply is a random key from {0, 1} η , sampled independently of k x , and for each query challenge(x) issued after the ith challenge query, the reply is k x ; (b) for the ith challenge query, namely challenge(u l ), the reply is k u l .
(c) for each query of the form encrypt(x, u l ), the reply is E kx (r u l ). (This is because, given E
d,i occurs, the reply for the last query of the form encrypt(x, u l )-which is the same as encrypt(u l−1 , u l )-is a fake ciphertext E ku l−1 (r u l ). This means that the reply for every query of that form must be fake, too.) (d) for every other encrypt (and corrupt) query, the reply is just as in the GSD game.
Notice that k u l and r u l are generated by A independently of each other and are not used in replying to any query other than that of the form encrypt(x, u l ) or challenge(u l ). So, if we modify conditions (b) and (c) as below (b') for the ith challenge query, namely challenge(u l ), the reply is r u l ; and (c') for each query of the form encrypt(x, u l ), the reply is E kx (k u l ).
the distribution of the replies given to A remains unmodified. Conditions (a), (b'), (c') and (d) can now succinctly be written as follows:
(a") for each query challenge(x) that is issued before the (i+1)th challenge query the reply is a random key from {0, 1} η , sampled independently of k x , and for each query challenge(x) issued after the (i + 1)th challenge query (and including it), the reply is k x ;
(b") for each encrypt and corrupt query, the reply is just as in the GSD game.
This is exactly the manner in which replies to A's queries are decided in Game i . As such, the view of A given E
d,i occurs is the same as its view in Game i given V chal (A) has size d. We are left with proving that P[E (0)
The proof for this statement uses techniques similar to those used to prove Claim A.4; we will, thus, omit many details.
For any w ∈ [n], let fnode(w), fpath(w) and flen(w) be random variables as defined in Section A.2.3. Let lnode(w) be the random variable corresponding to the last node pointing at w in G(A). Let Φ (d) denote the event that the size of V chal (A) equals d and Φ (d) (i) (w) (w ∈ [n]) the event that Φ (d) occurs and the ith node in it is w. As with fnode(w), fpath(w) and flen(w), the events Φ (d) , Φ (d) (i) (w) and the random variable lnode(w) are well-defined for any execution of A, not necessarily one involving interaction with A . The probability that event E
d,i occurs can be written in terms of these random variables as follows:
To understand the last part of this step (that is, why we require b, b l−l −1 , · · · b l−2 all to be equal to 1), observe that under the occurrence of E (0) d,i , (a) the reply to the query encrypt(u l−1 , u l ) must be fake, which means that b l−1 ⊕ b l−2 = 1 and so b l−2 = 1; and (b) the reply to all queries of the form encrypt(u j−1 , u j ) (j < l and j > l − 1 − flen(u l−1 )) must be real, which means that
For any l ∈ {0, · · · , l − 1}, and any vector of values
] can now be expressed in terms of these events as follows:
As in the proof of Claim A.4, we can show that P[E
] is equal to α/2 for every choice of l and − → w , and so
We now claim that the conditional probability P[E
] is equal to the probability of occurrence of E
in Game i . The proof of this claim uses the same ideas as used in the proof of Claim A.4 (specifically, one needs to carefully establish a one-to-one correspondance between transcripts-complete ones as well as partial ones-that do not violate E
in Game 0 and those that do not violate it in Game i ); details of the proof of the claim are omitted. Using the claim, we can re-write P[E (0)
Using essentially the same approach, we can also equate P[E (1)
as follows:
: We require w l to be the (i + 1)th node in V chal (A) and w l−1 to be the first node pointing at w l . Also notice that inẼ
, we require the b i 's to be equal to 0, not 1.) Now express P[E (1) d,i ] in terms of these events:
] can be shown to be equal to
], using which the desired expression for P[E
] is easily obtained:
and fix a bitvector − → ν j ∈ {0, 1} l−j . Consider the following modified version of Game 0 , which we call Game j,i j . In the setup phase, A first generates the values u j , u j+1 , · · · , u l and b j , · · · , b l−2 , b l−1 and it does so exactly as in the original version: u l and u l−1 are sampled uniformly at random from [n]; for each j ∈ {j, · · · , l − 2}, P[u j = 0] = 1/(2n + 1) and P[u j = x] (for any x ∈ [n]) equals 2/(2n+1); b l−1 = 0; and, b j , · · · , b l−2 are all sampled uniformly at random from {0, 1}. A then sets b j−1 = ν j ⊕ν j+1 ⊕· · ·⊕ν l−1 . Finally, A generates keys k 1 , · · · , k n (Note again: All keys are generated!) and also some other random values r u j , · · · , r u l (each sampled independently and uniformly at random from {0, 1} η ). In the execution phase, the replies to A's queries are decided as follows: For any corrupt query, corrupt(x), the reply is simply k x ; for every query of the form challenge(x) made before challenge(u l ), the reply is a random bitstring, generated independently of k x , and for every such query made after challenge(u l ) (and including it as well), the reply is k x . For every query of the form encrypt(u j , u j +1 ) such that j ∈ {j, · · · , l−1}, the reply is real, that is E ku j (k u j +1 ), if and only if b j = b j −1 (and is fake, that is E ku j (r u j +1 ) otherwise); for every query of the form encrypt(x, u j ) made before (resp. after) encrypt(u j −1 , u j ), the reply is fake (resp. real). For all other encrypt queries, except those of the form encrypt(x, u l ), the reply is always real. For queries of the form encrypt(x, u j ), the matter is a bit tricky: the first i j queries of this form (i j as fixed earlier on) are replied to with fake ciphertexts (E kx (r u j )) while the rest with real ones (E kx (k u j )). For any w ∈ [n], and any execution of A either in Game 0 or in Game j,i j , we define the
w). This event occurs if and only if
• V chal (A) has size d and u l is the ith node in it; and
• For all j ∈ {j + 1, · · · , l}, Indegree(u j ) = d j , u j −1 is the i j th node pointing at u j in G(A) and the reply given for query encrypt(u j −1 , u j ) is real if and only if ν j −1 = 0; and
• Indegree(u j ) = d j and w is the i j th node pointing at u j in G(A).
fined as follows:
Our task is to show that E and we will sketch the proof for this here. The proof, as in the proof of part 1, involves expressing each of these probabilities as a sum of various conditional probabilities; in the current proof, though, each such conditional probability expression P[E 1 | E 2 ] will be equated to an expression of the form P Game j,i j [E 1 ], and this will then be used to perform the summation. be the i j th node pointing at u j and the reply to the query encrypt(u j−1 , u j ) must be fake.
Since the replies to all queries of the form encrypt(u j −1 , u j ) for j > j are ascertained by the vector − → ν j and since, for s < j < j, every such query must be replied to with a real ciphertext, 
]. It can be checked easily that for any l ∈ {0, · · · , j − 1} and any − → w ∈ [n] l +1 ,
We claim that the probability P[E
] is equal to the probability that E is found (that is, truncate the "bad" transcripts at the point where they start violating E (l , − → w ) j,1
), the transcripts would look exactly like one in the interaction of A with A in Game j,i j . In effect, there is a one-to-one correspondance between "non-violating" transcripts in these two interactions. The probability P[E (l , − → w )
] is the ratio of the good (that is, not truncated) transcripts to the total number of transcripts in Game 0 , which, in the setting of Game j,i j , is the same as P Game j,i j [E And now using essentially the same approach one can also equate P[E When E
(1)
(i,i l ,··· ,i j+1 ,i j +1) (0 · − → ν j ) occurs in Game 0 , u j−1 is the (i j + 1)th node pointing at u j and the reply to the query encrypt(u j−1 , u j ) is real. The replies to all queries encrypt(u j −1 , u j ) for j > j are ascertained by the vector − → ν j , and for s < j < j, every such query is replied to with a real ciphertext. This implies that there is exactly one assignment to the variables b j−1 , b j−2 , · · · , b s , b for which E : we require w j−1 to be the (i j + 1)th node (and not the i j th one) pointing at u j . P[E ] which can (using the same techniques as used in the case of E (0) j,d,i ( − → ν j )) be shown to be equal to
The first term, p 1 , in the right hand side can easily be shown to be equal to The second term, p 2 , is harder to tackle. For any l ∈ {0, · · · , j−2} and − → w = (w j−l −2 , · · · , w j−2 ) ∈
[n] l +1 , define the following two events: Thus,
